Secret Sauce of the Economy: Total Factor Productivity Explained
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Imagine two factories. Each employs the same number of people, uses the same equipment and purchases the same raw materials. However, one factory produces 10% more goods than the other.
If the amount of resources (labour, equipment and material costs) is the same, then the difference in output can be attributed only to the way the resources are used. This it the very secret to the first factory success: it can be explained, for example, by the better organisation of labour and better skills, better logistics within the workshop and minimal equipment downtime. It may use the same machines as the other factory, but they run on more advanced software that optimises raw material costs.
The case of the factories can be extended to the macroeconomic level. The economy has three classical factors of production, or of resources: labour, capital (equipment and property) and land. Total factor productivity (TFP) is an indicator of how efficiently they are used.
Total factor productivity reflects the capacity of an economy to boost output without increasing resource inputs, by using them more efficiently. The economy can grow extensively, that is, by increasing labour and capital, but only up to a certain point. Endless hiring is impossible because labour resources are finite, while capital is marked by diminishing returns. For example, if you buy a car, you can move about much faster than on foot, but a second car will bring you no further advantages in terms of speed. Therefore, it is total factor productivity in the long term that is ‘responsible’ for the sustainability of economic growth.
Secret ingredient of growth
The foundations for the concept of total factor productivity were laid down in the 1940s by Jan Tinbergen, a Dutch economist and the first winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (1969), and George Stigler, a US economist and subsequently also a Nobel Prize winner. Both provided empirical evidence that part of output growth cannot be attributed to a simple increase in the factors of production.
In 1942, Tinbergen analysed the increase in output and the factors of production in France, Germany, the UK and the US between 1870 and 1914. His calculations showed that US output grew by an average of 4.1% per year over the period, but the factors of production increased by a mere 3%. About a quarter of US output growth (1.1 percentage points of the 4.1%) was driven by what Tinbergen called ‘efficiency’. His paper in German was published at the height of World War II and initially attracted little attention. It was translated into English only in 1959.
Independently of Tinbergen, George Stigler developed the same idea at around the same time. In his 1947 work, he showed that the traditional indicator of production efficiency – the volume of output per worker – is not fully informative because it mixes the efficiency of labour itself and the effects of other resources such as equipment and materials.
Stigler argued for a switch from a single measure (labour productivity) to an aggregate measure, estimating what he called the ‘efficiency of use of resources’ across 12 US manufacturing sectors between 1904 and 1937. It turned out that the rapid growth in labour productivity in oil and coal, for example (239%), came with heavy capital spending, while output per unit of capital fell by 45%, dragging down the industry’s overall efficiency.
Thus, Tinbergen's and Stigler's works find that there is a ‘secret ingredient’ in output growth that cannot be reduced only to growth in labour and capital, or, rather, that there is a ‘secret sauce’ that binds the factors of production together and turns them into something more than the sum of their parts.
At the same time, the studies did not go far beyond empirical estimates and left open the question of how to interpret this ‘sauce’: is it something fundamental, or is it nothing more than a statistical artefact?
Discovery of total factor productivity
The answer came from Robert Solow (link in Russian), who was awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize for the discovery. Solow translated Stigler’s and Tinbergen’s empirical findings into the language of fundamental theory: a theory of economic growth.
In his 1956 article, Solow builds a mathematical model to show that the accumulation of fixed capital in itself cannot ensure continuous long-term growth and that such growth cannot emerge without technological progress. According to the logic of the model, there are labour, capital and technology, and there is a production function which converts them into a certain amount of output. Humans save part of the output they produce by allocating it to capital investment (in the Solow model, savings are equal to investments): an increasing labour force requires that each new employee be provided with equipment, machines, etc.
When an increase in the population leads to an increase in the capital endowment by a corresponding value, the economy finds a steady-state equilibrium and saves as much capital as is needed for the new employees. The lack of capital triggers a ‘pull up’ to the equilibrium point, that is, investments grow faster and spur economic growth. Contrariwise, if the amount of capital is greater than the equilibrium level, the capital endowment declines towards the equilibrium because each additional unit of capital added to a fixed amount of labour yields ever less extra output, which is known as a diminishing return on capital.
The conclusion was revolutionary at the time: rising investment cannot deliver ‘perpetual’ economic growth because of the diminishing return on capital. This means that without technologies that raise the returns on labour and capital, long-term GDP per capita growth is impossible: given limited resources (labour and capital), technological progress emerges as the key driver of economic growth over the long term.
The Solow model became the starting point and benchmark for many contemporary theories of economic growth. The part of output growth that is, according to Solow, not associated with an increase in capital or the workforce came to be known as the ‘Solow residual’: total factor productivity.
It is called a ‘residual’ because, despite its key role in long-term growth, it cannot be observed directly. In statistical terms, total factor productivity is measured as a residual: the share of output growth that is not linked to growth in hours worked or the quantity of equipment, which are both easier to quantify.
By Solow’s calculations , this residual accounts for an implausibly large share of the long-term GDP per capita growth: almost 88%. The figure has never since been confirmed, but if GDP growth is broken down into the contributions of labour and the capital endowment, a significant unexplained residual does remain.
Current studies focused on the US and certain other countries (for example, 1, 2) agree that total factor productivity accounts for roughly half of the growth in GDP per capita, with the other half delivered by capital accumulation. In other words, half of long-term growth is investment ‘in hardware’ (fixed capital), and the other half is the ‘secret sauce’: the degree of success with which the economy utilises all the resources internally.
Internal strength of economies
According to Solow, long-term growth is determined by an exogenous (external) factor: technological change. In 1957 paper he stressed that ‘technological change’ is ‘any kind of shift in the production function’, and thus ‘slowdowns, speedups, improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sorts of things will appear as ‘technical change’.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the view had taken hold that technology is not a gift of nature but a result of endogenous, i.e. internal, processes within the economy. The key works on the subject are those of Robert Lucas (1988) and Paul Romer (1990), who were both subsequently awarded Nobel prizes in economics.
For Lucas, the role of human capital comes to the fore. He emphasised that education and skills are much more than private goods for individuals, for they generate strong network effects, producing a better-educated society on average. Public spending on one individual’s education therefore raises the productivity not only of that individual but of their related parties. In the language of economics, this is a positive externality.
Romer, by contrast, focused on positive externalities in the form of innovative ideas. He surmised that the use of ideas, unlike of other resources, is not limited, meaning that ideas are not rival goods. A machine producing component A cannot concurrently produce component B: the production of A competes with the production of B. But when it comes to ideas, there is no such tight competition: entrepreneurs and inventors can work with multiple different ideas at the same time. This generates increasing returns not only thanks to network effects (when people learn from one another) but also thanks to the synthesis of knowledge as it accumulates and evolves.
The important role of ideas and innovation had been highlighted earlier, in 1939, by Joseph Schumpeter. It was he who put forward the concept of ‘creative destruction’: progress and economic growth are achieved through the creation of new, more efficient, structures, while older ones which fail to withstand the competition are destroyed. In this paradigm, competition is not merely a process of selecting those who can produce a given good or service at the lowest cost with unchanged technology but one of selecting the most successful innovations: new innovations destroy old business models, which prove unable to adapt and are squeezed out of the market.
The key link in this process is the entrepreneur, who risks their own capital. If a bet on a new technology pays off, entrepreneurs reap the rewards of being first movers; in the event of failure, they bear all the risks. This creates the necessary degree of competition between ideas.
Today, total factor productivity is seen as the effect on output growth not only of technology but of new ideas, innovations, the more efficient organisation of production and work processes, the optimal allocation of resources across industries, wider competition and an improved institutional environment – everything that helps capital and labour interact more efficiently.
Main engine of economic growth
The stark differences in living standards that exist between countries today are mainly attributable to differences in total factor productivity: according to one estimate, the measure accounts for more than 66%of cross-country variation. A country cannot raise its living standards simply by expanding its workforce or capital investment. If the number of people grows, but they each produce as much as before, living standards will stagnate even though total GDP will increase. As noted above, capital investment is characterised by diminishing returns. This leaves total factor productivity as the only possible source of sustained growth in per capita income, writes the IMF’s Robert Zymek.
Growth in total factor productivity enables middle-income countries to join the club of high-income countries, find South Korean researchers studying data for 1975–2014. Economists at the OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank have shown that the slow growth in per capita income in the Latin American countries (relative to the advanced economies such as the US and to many developing economies) is mainly driven by a lag in TFP growth rather than barriers to accumulation of the factors of production.
In recent years, which have been marked by a boom in digital technology and artificial intelligence (AI), a debate has emerged about how much they may contribute to productivity growth. According to MIT professor and Nobel laureate Daron Acemoglu, the productivity effects of AI are likely to be modest: at most a rise of about 0.6–1% over 10 years. IMF experts agree: modelling the medium-term impact of AI adoption on total factor productivity across 31 European countries, they found that aggregate productivity in Europe will grow by about 1% over five years.
In China, by contrast, AI is seen as a key driver of total factor productivity gains: Chinese researchers conclude that the effect of AI adoption is 40 times stronger than that of ordinary patents.
Estimates of the future impact of AI vary widely, and the actual outcome will likely depend on how society responds to technological change in terms of self-organisation, institutions and social structures.
Either way, economic growth will depend to a large extent on future movements in total factor productivity. As stated above, total factor productivity depends both on technology and on institutional factors, the internal organisation of the real sector and specific industries, and competition and incentives for entrepreneurs and managers.