GDP rates may be driven by different processes: capital, employment, and productivity growth. The key issue of the next decade is not about low or high growth rates, but rather about the economy expanding by overstretching its resources or by producing more with the same inputs.
  |   Pavel Vikharev, Sergey Yermakov

Contents

Mass media tend to discuss economic growth as a single figure, such as ‘GDP was up by 4%’ or ‘the economy declined by 1%’. However, the processes underlying the same figure may differ fundamentally. Economic growth may be driven by rising employment, by businesses installing more machinery, by previously idle capacity utilised to fulfil new orders, or by the expansion of output with the same labour force and equipment but with more efficient technologies, corporate governance, and resource allocation. These processes may have fundamentally different implications for long-term growth.

  • If boosted by a temporary spike in employment and higher utilisation rates of the existing production capacity (short-term growth), economic growth may grind to a halt quickly because of shortages of labour, machinery, and infrastructure. Further boosting the economy will only provoke faster price growth. Accelerating inflation will erode the benefits of higher nominal incomes and threaten macroeconomic stability, which might be very costly (link in Russian) for society.
  • If driven by sustained and accelerated capital accumulation at the expense of consumption or by a demographic boom (extensive long-term growth), the economy will continue to expand only as long as production factors (capital and labour) keep growing at a rapid pace. This economic growth will terminate at the moment when a further increase in capital becomes possible solely through investment in equipment maintenance and renewal and when labour force growth discontinues due to the demographic constraints observed worldwide in recent decades. Similarly, if fuelled by a sustained favourable environment in global export markets, output, like the economy, will stop expanding.
  • By contrast, if growth is associated with a stable increase in productivity (intensive long-term growth), the economy is better-positioned to expand further: with the same amount of resources, it can maintain production without amplifying costs or inflationary pressures. When analysing the sustainability of economic growth, therefore, one should assess both its rate and sources.

This is especially important for Russia. Economic growth in Russia was diverse over the past three decades. Russia experienced a series of fundamentally different, alternating growth regimes. Russia’s annual GDP growth averaged 3% over 1996–2025. However, this average is derived from the growth rates of substantially different periods, including the rapid recovery growth after the collapse in the 1990s (5–10% per year), a notable slowdown after the global financial crisis (about 2–3% per year), the pandemic-induced slump (-2.7% per year), the structural shock of 2022 (-1.4%), and the subsequent acceleration in 2023–2024 (4–5% per year). As a result of these events, economic growth rates in Russia over this period were much more volatile than the global average.

Average economic growth rates in Russia and worldwide, %

Given the international context, it is becoming increasingly important to identify the sources of economic growth. Advanced economies have experienced stagnant productivity and a decline in demographics for many years now, while the largest emerging market economies risk falling into the middle-income trap as the effect of population momentum fades. Analysing current GDP growth rates in terms of productivity factors is critical for understanding and forecasting these processes.

Arithmetic of long-term economic growth

Growth accounting is one of the most common tools for analysing the sources of economic expansion. The basic version of the method breaks down economic growth into three parts: labour, capital, and total factor productivity (TFP). In other words, GDP growth is equal to a rise in efficiency (intensive growth) and a weighted sum of an increase in capital and labour (extensive growth).

In practice, the portion of economic output that cannot be explained by the inputs of labour and capital is often referred to as the Solow residual, after Robert Solow (link in Russian), an outstanding economist (link in Russian). This cautious wording is used because this residual in the real world includes not only the economy’s net productivity but also other factors, such as accumulated human capital and changes in the quality of physical capital, export and import prices, firms’ electricity costs, intermediate materials and services (the B2B segment), resource redistribution across firms and sectors, as well as other measurement errors.

Additionally, economists frequently interpret TFP as new production technologies, management quality, and organisational practices, that is, a measure of how efficiently an economy combines available resources. Therefore, the Solow residual is only an approximation of TFP changes in the economy, and it may be significantly distorted.

How much capital does the economy need?

To answer this question, one can imagine a worker at a production site, whose output will surge if he has one machine. However, if the worker has two machines, output is likely to increase, but it almost certainly will not double since the worker will be unable to utilise both machines equally efficiently. If the worker has three or four machines, the increase in output will be negligible because the worker’s physical resources, such as time and attention, are limited.

Moreover, new capital requires maintenance costs. Therefore, at a certain point, an expansion of capital will raise the maintenance costs of this new capital to a level commensurate with the benefits of the extra output. This simple example intuitively demonstrates that building up capital cannot be a stable source of long-term economic growth.

Modern economics – from Solow’s classic model to innovative micro-founded models of endogenous growth – also interprets capital as a renewable production factor that adjusts endogenously to output. Most modern models of economic growth employ a long-term benchmark for the trajectory of an economy – a balanced growth path (BGP) – along which all key variables (GDP, capital, consumption, etc.) grow at a constant rate.

In terms of a BGP, it is TFP and demographics, rather than capital, that determine sustainable economic growth rates. This is because capital-driven growth is subject to natural limits. If the other factors of production are held constant and capital is built up, the contribution of every new unit of capital to GDP growth will decline due to the diminishing marginal productivity of capital.

This, however, does not mean that capital does not expand along a BGP. It grows to match TFP dynamics and demographics. For example, an increase in capital will be necessary to keep a growing labour force equipped (to maintain the capital-labour ratio) or to replace outdated tools with more modern equipment. As a result, over the long run capital becomes endogenous along a BGP and increases, driven by the rise in TFP and demographics.

Demographics as the main challenge to long-term growth

Since the mid-twentieth century, the world economy was experiencing a persistent slowdown in population growth (from 2% per year in the 1960s to less than 1% in 2025), caused primarily by demographic processes in emerging market economies. A slower increase in the labour force base, despite extended life expectancy and later retirement, weighs heavily on growth in hours worked. According to the UN’s recent World Population Prospects, the global population will start declining in the 2080s, while the share of the population at working ages will begin shrinking as early as the mid-2050s.

This challenges the growth prospects of both global and per capita GDP since many economic theories of long-term growth attribute TFP increases to the growth rates and age structure of the population. The relationship between demographics and TFP is explained by accumulated knowledge, the number of people engaged in research and development (R&D), and business activity (1; 2; 3; 4 (link in Russian)).

In this regard, Russia’s position is even more vulnerable as its demographic situation is comparable with that of advanced economies, but, in contrast to the latter, the inflow of highly qualified labour migrants and human capital into Russia is smaller. From 1996, Russia’s population declined by around 2–3%, while advanced and emerging market economies recorded increases of 15% and 50%, respectively.

Population in Russia and worldwide, % vs 1996

The positive contribution of labour to GDP growth rates in Russia came largely from higher labour force participation (to levels close to the highs seen in advanced economies) across all age groups and from raising the pension age, which increased participation among older adults. In addition to extensive growth in the number of workers, the Russian economy was undergoing an intensive process – the accumulation (link in Russian) of human capital in the form of knowledge and skills. However, this process ran counter to stagnant demographics.

‘Secret sauce’ for long-term growth

TFP is is a kind of ‘secret sauce’ for intensive economic growth that separates economic leaders from laggards in the longer run. In the longer term, once the capital-output ratio reaches its equilibrium, per capita GDP (which is directly connected with well-being) is determined primarily by TFP. Importantly, ensuring stable long-term growth requires a sustained pace of innovation. Hence, institutions and the education system as well as the quality of government regulation (link in Russian) come to the fore.

TFP has been a focus of research in recent decades due to decelerating global productivity growth. Since the mid-twentieth century, advanced economies have gone through several distinct phases of TFP dynamics. Specifically, the post-war economic boom, driven by major innovations of the first half of the 20th century, gave way to a protracted slowdown after the 1970s. At the end of the 1990s, the expansion was localised and linked to the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT). However, from the second half of the 2000s, ICT returns started to slow down. Partly for this reason, a broad decline in TFP growth rates was observed in the 2010s.

The phenomenon of a global slowdown in productivity growth in 2000–2020 is known as the productivity puzzle and is often attributed, in addition to imperfect statistics and inefficient resource allocation, to insufficient R&D effort and difficulties of "extracting" economic growth from R&D ideas.

Annual TFP growth in Russia and worldwide, %

The Russian research literature contains numerous estimates of Russia’s TFP dynamics produced using a variety of methodological approaches. Despite the differences in these approaches, the results broadly converge on a coherent picture.

Annual TFP growth in Russia: estimates from Russian research, %

The results normally indicate a decline in TFP in the 1990s and its subsequent recovery growth after 1998, which slowed down markedly after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. On the one hand, this is in line with the global trend, but on the other hand, foreign sanctions had an additional negative effect on Russia.

Consequently, the Russian economy’s efficiency (TFP) peaked in 2012–2014 relative to the majority of the most efficient countries (64% on the median), whereas in the next decade, this ratio was declining steadily and reached 58% in 2023.

Relative TFP by purchasing power parity in Russia vs countries with high TFP, %

As regards the world’s future, modern macroeconomic discourse is focused on the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into business processes as the main factor which may foster a sustainable increase in global TFP and accelerate economic growth. However, estimates of the macroeconomic effects from AI adoption vary significantly; a lot will depend on how broadly companies integrate AI into their production processes and whether AI becomes ‘a technology creating new technologies’.

There are also other global factors with opposite effects, such as geoeconomic and technological fragmentation: rising trade barriers, sanctions, constraints on investment and technology flows. It works in the opposite direction, narrowing markets, impairing access to technologies, pushing up technology adaptation costs, and hindering the diffusion of knowledge, thus undermining global TFP growth.

How the Russian economy was growing before 2025

The recent history of Russia’s growth vividly demonstrates that the sources of economic growth may differ greatly in different periods. 

Decomposition of Russia’s GDP growth into factors* and Bank of Russia’s range of long-term growth rates

In the 1990s, the Russian economy moved into a transformational recession, accompanied by lower employment, the underutilisation and degradation of production facilities, the destruction of production chains, and worsening coordination among enterprises, that is, the disorganisation of production. In terms of TFP, this should be interpreted as a slump in efficiency.

The situation changed after 1998 as a result of the structural reforms implemented, the devaluation of the ruble, debt restructuring, and higher energy commodity prices, which enabled the economy to overcome the recession. In 1999–2008, the Russian economy demonstrated the highest growth rates in the country’s contemporary history, boosted by a beneficial combination of multiple factors.

Specifically, the country finally achieved macroeconomic stabilisation to a certain extent, while a weaker ruble increased the competitiveness of Russian exports in the global market, which was especially helpful to the oil and gas industry. Moreover, enterprises had a large number of idle production facilities and available labour resources which could be engaged in the production process quite quickly and without significant additional investment.

Concurrently, the world economy was undergoing extensive globalisation and ICT implementation processes, with advanced technologies being relatively accessible and international capital markets opened. Foreign investment and higher crude prices boosted the import of new equipment, accelerating capital formation.

This is the reason why it is impossible to easily replicate the experience of the 2000s since it was largely associated with harnessing the benefits of catch-up growth (link in Russian). The economy was able to increase productivity by adopting already existing technologies and utilising previously idle resources.

The Russian economy’s growth regime changed after the global financial crisis. In 2010–2013, economic growth was partly a rebound after the decline of 2009, but TFP growth was much slower, about 1% per year. In 2014–2019, productivity growth rates hovered around zero on average, decreasing in 2014–2016 and then rising weakly. TFP was dragged down by sanctions, lower crude prices, reduced opportunities for technology transfer, limited access to external financing, and a global slowdown in productivity. Capital growth was becoming increasingly important as a source of economic expansion.

Since 2020, the Russian economy has faced two large-scale shocks: the consequences of the pandemic in 2020 and the structural shifts across a wide range of industries associated with the intensifying sanctions after 2022. The pandemic temporarily weighed on GDP dynamics, destabilising global supply chains, and reduced the utilisation of production factors. The geopolitical shock led to a disruption and subsequent transformation of trade, financial, and technological ties.

In 2023–2025, the economy was going through an active phase of structural transformation, which was accompanied by the optimisation of production processes, the redistribution of resources, fuller use of the available capacity, and the establishment of new production facilities. However, this growth ran into natural constraints. In 2025, the economy exhausted its opportunities for extensive growth, with utilisation rates reaching their technological maximum and unemployment dropping to historic lows.

Where the Russian economy might be in 2035

What are the implications of these developments for Russia’s future? An inertia scenario, presented in our new study (link in Russian), is neither dire nor does it assume a return to the growth rates of the 2000s: TFP increases at about 0.8% per year, which is close to the pace of the past five to ten years. Taking into account the negative contribution of labour, weak demographics, and constraints in the labour market, potential output growth rates will average approximately 1.5% per year until 2035.

Note that any long-term forecast is a set of assumptions and the resulting scenarios, rather than a single point on a diagram that an economy will inevitably settle on. As regards the Russian economy’s development along the BGP, the key assumptions concern domestic and global TFP.

  • If the global technology frontier accelerates as a result of AI adaptation and Russia is able to participate fully in this process, TFP growth may be higher (+0.4% per year) and, accordingly, GDP will increase by about 2.5% annually.
  • By contrast, if geoeconomic fragmentation intensifies and access to technologies and markets is limited, global TFP growth will slow down (-0.2% per year). Consequently, Russia’s TFP growth will decelerate, with GDP increasing by roughly 1% per year.
  • If foreign countries ease the economic restrictions and the Russian economy deepens its participation in international production chains, it will be able to recover lost ground relative to the technological frontier, which will ensure GDP growth of about 3% per year.
  • If the domestic economy continues to lag behind, widening this gap, long-term output growth rates may be as low as 0.5% per year.
  • If demographics improve, this will ensure GDP growth of around 1.7% annually versus 1.4% in the negative scenario.

Russia’s GDP to 2035 in different scenarios (4Q 2025=100)

The main conclusion is that the issue of Russia’s future economic development is not about ‘prescribing’ a higher GDP growth rate, but rather about the sources of this growth.

Growth through hiring new workers is limited by demographics. Growth driven by capital is limited by depreciation, investment returns, and declining marginal productivity. Sustainable economic growth over a longer horizon requires a consistent rise in TFP: technologies, competition, the size of markets, adaptation of the best management practices, and the redistribution of resources towards more efficient firms and sectors.

The key issue of the next decade is not about low or high GDP growth rates in a particular year, but rather about the economy expanding not by overstretching its resources but by learning to produce more with the same inputs. The first path might generate impressive figures, but only in the short run, due to resource constraints. The second path might give more modest results in the near term, but would enable the economy to achieve higher rates over a multi-decade horizon.